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FINES: THE FOLLY OF CONFLATING THE POWER TO FINE
WITH THE POWER TO TAX
MILDRED WIGFALL ROBINSON*
INTRODUCTION
FERGUSON, Missouri is a St. Louis suburb of roughly 21,000 people—67% of whom currently self-identify as black or African-American.1
Ferguson gained instant notoriety on August 9, 2014 when Michael Brown,
an unarmed black teenager, died on a Ferguson street of bullet wounds
inflicted by a white police officer.2  In so doing, Mr. Brown became what
was then the latest victim of a confrontation between a police officer and a
young black man gone wrong, and Ferguson, Missouri became one more
name on the dreary list of American towns and cities in which such an
interaction turned deadly in 2014 alone.3
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Ravenell, for the invitation to participate in the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW’s 2016
Norman J. Shachoy Symposium: Exploring Police Accountability in America.  This
Essay expands upon remarks made during the symposium.  I thank Professors
Taunya L. Banks and Ruth Mason and the participants in the symposium for
helpful questions and comments.  I thank my research assistant, Carly Coleman
(UVA Law, 2017), and our wonderful library staff for outstanding research
assistance.  Finally, I thank the editorial staff of the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW for
their support and understanding.  All mistakes and errors are my own.
1. See Ferguson, Mo., CENSUS REPORTER, https://censusreporter.org/profiles/
16000US2923986-ferguson-mo [https://perma.cc/GAT8-U9JV] (last visited June
14, 2017).
2. See What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-af-
ter-police-shooting.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/K5AS-E57Y].
3. See Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of
Black Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2016, 3:45 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory
.html#2014 [https://perma.cc/9TTE-HQ7H].  This Essay discusses other un-
armed black citizens killed by police gunfire during 2014: Ezell Ford, 25, Los Ange-
les (8/11/14); Eric Garner, 43, New York City (7/17/14); Akai Gurley, 28, New
York City (2/11/14); LaQuan McDonald, 17, Chicago, Illinois (10/20/14); Tamir
Rice, 12, Cleveland, Ohio (11/22/14); and Yvette Smite, 47, Bastrope County,
Texas (2/16/14). See id.  Note here that as of 2014, there were no composite data
establishing either the number of victims of police shootings in that year, black or
white, or the circumstances under which such events occurred.  The Washington
Post sought to compile a record of every fatal police shooting in the nation in 2015,
something no government agency had done.  The project began after a police
officer shot and killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014, pro-
voking several nights of fiery riots, weeks of protests and a national reckoning with
the nexus of race, crime, and police use of force.
[The Washington Post data show that since 2014,] “[r]ace remains the
most volatile flash point in any accounting of police shootings.  Although
black men make up only 6 percent of the U.S. population, they account
(925)
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On September 4, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) began a wide-ranging civil rights investiga-
tion looking beyond the shooting itself into the practices of the Ferguson
Police Department.4  That investigation examined departmental practices
in the years immediately prior to the shooting.  Additional points of in-
quiry were driven by reports that police disproportionately targeted black
motorists during traffic stops.5
The DOJ report was issued on March 4, 2015.6  The DOJ found that
“law enforcement practices [were] shaped by the City’s focus on revenue
rather than by public safety needs.”7  The report continued: “This empha-
sis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson’s
police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing”
especially against the city’s predominately black and poor population.8
The revenues referenced in the report were municipal fines and fees to be
generated by the city’s police and court staff.  The increased collections were
intended to offset significant revenue shortfalls from tax and more tradi-
tional nontax sources, which shortfalls had to be redressed if necessary
municipal services were to be maintained.
As citizens, we expect the police “to protect and to serve.”9  So how
does a police force become revenue collector instead of protector?  On
for 40 percent of the unarmed men shot to death by police this year
[2015].
Kimberly Kindy, et. al, A Year of Reckoning: Police Fatally Shot Nearly 1,000, WASH.
POST (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/
26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000/?utm_term=.2d864a8362fd
[https://perma.cc/3YDB-TFXM]. That pattern holds through the Washington Post
2016 data. See Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graph-
ics/national/police-shootings-2016/ [https://perma.cc/C4Z8-8V93] (last visited
Oct. 5, 2017).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPART-
MENT (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/at-
tachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6ZNT-L63X] [hereinafter DOJ Ferguson Report].
5. “A 2013 report by the Missouri Attorney General’s office found that Fergu-
son police stopped and arrested black drivers nearly twice as frequently as white
motorists but were also less likely to find contraband among the black drivers.”
Associated Press, Ferguson Police to be Investigated After Shooting of Michael Brown,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2014, 05:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
sep/04/ferguson-police-practices-investigated-michael-brown-justice-department
[https://perma.cc/G2E9-58ND].
6. See generally DOJ Ferguson Report supra note 4, at 4.
7. See id. at 2.
8. See id.
9. Interestingly, a policeman initially formulated this expression of responsi-
bility.  The phrase originated with the Los Angeles Police Department which, in
February 1955, conducted an internal contest for a motto for the police academy.
See The Origin of the LAPD Motto, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/
history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1128 [https://perma.cc/L4HD-3HXH]
(last visited June 14, 2017).  The winning entry was the motto, “To Protect and to
Serve” submitted by Officer Joseph S. Dorobek. See id.  On November 4, 1963, the
Los Angeles City Council passed the necessary ordinance and the credo has now
2
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the local level, we “purchase” through taxes police and fire protection as
well as a myriad of other services.  This Essay explores how reliance on
traffic fines for general budgetary purposes became a matter of general
practice in Ferguson and many other towns and cities.  It ultimately serves
as a reminder that there are very sound economic and civic reasons to rely
upon “taxes as the price we pay for a civilized society.”10
Michael Brown’s tragic death catalyzes this exploration of the linkage
between exploitive financial practice and discriminatory police practices
in the city of Ferguson.  It remains the case that even in the absence of
racial overtones and dire outcomes of the type occurring in Ferguson, reli-
ance on this kind of non-tax revenue to balance local budgets in many
other American cities and towns is equally if not more problematic.11  The
practice is one that should be either constrained or avoided.
Recently, the existence, extent, and consequences of the pervasive
and increasing use of fines as it affects individuals has been addressed pri-
marily in the criminal law legal literature.12  To date, only one article ap-
been placed alongside the City Seal on the Department’s patrol cars. See id.  The
phrase has since been adopted by many other police departments though the Fer-
guson police department does not appear to be one of these.
10. This quote is popularly attributed to Justice Holmes in a 1904 speech.  It
has been alternatively phrased as “Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.” See
Compania Gen. De Tabacos De Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S.
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  The first variation is quoted by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service above the entrance to its headquarters at 1111 Constitution
Avenue, Washington, D.C. See Tax Quotes, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
tax-quotes [https://perma.cc/RUL9-NV6G] (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
11. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson et al., Ferguson Became Symbol, but Bias Knows
No Border, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/us/
ferguson-became-symbol-but-bias-knows-no-border.html [https://perma.cc/27L4-
BHXH].  This piece provides:
While statistics alone are not clear-cut proof of discrimination, there are
cities around St. Louis with far greater racial disparities in traffic stops
than Ferguson, and cities with court systems that appear even more pred-
atory than the Justice Department says Ferguson’s is.  According to a re-
port from Better Together, a nonprofit group, Ferguson does not even rank
among the top 20 municipalities in St. Louis County in the percentage of
its budget drawn from court fines and fees.  The small city of Edmund-
son, five miles away, brings in nearly $600 a year in court fines for every
resident, more than six times the amount in Ferguson.
Id.  This kind of reliance is not limited to municipalities in Missouri. See infra note
32.
12. See generally Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-
Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483 (2016) (analyzing ways in
which fees, fines, court courts, penalties, and interest rates combine to financial
detriment of poorer citizens in violation of the Sixth Amendment); Tamar R.
Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV 1595 (2015) (explaining that
families caught within state’s debt-enforcement regime, face threats of punishment
as an ever-present specter, and incarceration always looms and further explaining
court fees serve as a straightforward revenue source for the state creating a hidden
regressive tax that turns court and correctional officials into collection agents, bur-
dening the system, and interfering with the proper administration of justice); Beth
A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation as a Tool of Sys-
3
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pearing in legal literature has been written that examines this practice
from the standpoint of municipal governance.13  In this Essay, I seek to
add to that sparse literature by examining the practice as a matter of mu-
nicipal finance with the hope that this additional perspective will further
stimulate the robust discussion that the topic merits.
My discussion will proceed as follows.  In Part I of this Essay, I will
briefly recount the role that the property tax has historically played in pro-
viding revenues for governmental costs on the local level.14  I will also de-
scribe how local governments may react when revenues from property
taxes fail to keep pace with costs.15  Part II of my discussion will review
Ferguson’s financial story in some detail and will show how that town came
to rely so heavily on non-tax sources of revenue, specifically traffic fines
and fees.16  It will also explore the role race placed in causing the practice
to be particularly egregious in Ferguson.17  In Part III, I will return to a
general discussion of the characteristics of general and excise taxes as
compared to user charges and fees emphasizing the factors that accord to
the payee in both sets of exactions protection against inordinate liability.18
Part IV distinguishes fines with principal attention to traffic fines from
user charges and fees with particular attention to how payee protections
break down in the case of traffic fines and fees.19  I will make two addi-
tional points: (1) the comparative absence of payee protections makes traf-
fic fines and fees (and tangentially lifestyle fines) an inappropriate
revenue source for defraying the general costs of governance; and (2) this
concern in particularly compelling light of fines and fees’ regressivity and
lack of payee control over total liability.20  In Part V, I will summarize the
enormous civic costs on governance in general in addition to immediate
and possibly disabling financial costs upon those cited as well as unfore-
seen and unrelated legal difficulties that may ensue when citations remain
temic Reform, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1171 (2017); Beth A. Colgan, Policing and
Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (2015) (criticizing use of governments policy power
to raise revenues through fees imposed on arrestees and defendants); Beth A. Col-
gan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277 (2014) (reconstructing
the case for protection from excessive fines under the Eighth amendment); Jessica
M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1837 (2015)
(proposing improving economic sanctions under the Model Penal Code).
13. See Henry Ordower et al., Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts,
Tax Distribution and Constitutional Limitations 5 (St. Louis University School of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854372 [https://perma.cc/L2R4-M43Z] (“[T]his article
focuses on the economic impact of discriminatory municipal law enforcement.”
(footnote omitted)).
14. See infra notes 23–36 and accompanying text.
15. See id.
16. See infra notes 37–88 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 38–87 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 88–108 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
20. See id.
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unpaid.21  Part VI concludes and asserts in short, that given the range of
undesirable, unanticipated, and unintended consequences, traffic fines
cannot and should not be treated as tax substitutes and relied upon as
sources of general revenue.22  Further, in those rare, compelling instances
where municipalities are permitted to rely on non-tax revenue to defray
general governance costs, such use should be limited and strictly
monitored.
I. THE PROPERTY TAX IN HISTORICAL AND FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE
American governments have over time relied on three categories of
taxes as sources of general revenue: income taxes—federal and state; retail
sales taxes—primarily state; and property taxes—primarily local.23  Since
roughly the 1930s, the ad varlorem tax on real property has been local gov-
ernments’ primary source of revenue.24  This was largely happenstance;
national and state governments had established dominance in income
(federal and state) and retail sales (state) taxes.  In any case, however, the
property tax proved ideal for local governments.  The tax is administra-
tively feasible for what are likely to be comparatively thinly-staffed govern-
ments because the value of immovable property constitutes its base;
evasion is thus quite impossible!  Further, the tax is quite universally
borne; it falls on property owners as well as by renters, the latter group
bearing the owner’s tax cost as a part of the rental.
The relatively stable base, however, provides no particular economic
advantage if property values fail to keep pace with public costs.  Revenues
may be destabilized if property values are stagnant or decline and thus fail
to keep pace with government’s financial needs.  Second, limitations on
revenue generation may be externally imposed upon the property tax
through constitutional or statutory requirements intended to provide
taxpayer relief—a relatively recent but widespread practice.25  In either
21. See infra notes 116–29 and accompanying text.
22. Parts II–IV of the discussion will focus exclusively on traffic fines because
that is the context in which the Ferguson report was framed.  I will, however, in
Part V of this Essay comment on related issues raised by citations issued in re-
sponse to violation of “quality-of-life” or “life-style” ordinances.
23. See generally URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., THE TAX POLICY CENTER’S
BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE FASCINATING (THOUGH OFTEN COMPLEX)
ELEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM ch. 2 (2016), www.taxpolicycenter.org/
briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue [https://perma.cc/EBE3-4X9H] [herein-
after TPC Briefing Book].
24. In 2014, revenue from property taxes constituted the single largest source
of revenue for local governments and provided approximately 30% of all revenue.
See id. at ch. 3.
25. See generally Bing Yuan et al., Tax and Expenditure Limitations and Local Pub-
lic Finances 149–92, in EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE (Nancy Augustine et al.
eds., 2009).  In the states during the four decades between 1973, legislative activity
(with occasional constitutional amendment) has been replete with imposition of
expansive tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) having the cumulative effect of
significantly diminishing the revenue productivity of the tax. See id.  Overall tax
5
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case, localities may have difficulty generating enough revenue from the
tax alone to offset costs.26
When the property tax standing alone cannot generate necessary rev-
enue (and to avoid deemed undesirable cuts in public services), tax reve-
nues may be supplemented through other sources.  These additional
sources have come to include general retail sales taxes as well as excise
taxes targeting specific transactions (e.g., tobacco and alcohol).27  In addi-
tion, fees (licenses, inspections, etc.) and charges imposed upon using
public parks, marinas, golf courses, libraries, and other public amenities
have come to play an increasingly significant role in local finance.28  Fi-
nally, excise taxes specifically targeting tourists on meals, hotels, and
rental cars have become an important way of further enhancing revenue
without burdening residents (at least theoretically).29
This aggregate of various collections may nonetheless leave a local
government unable to achieve a balanced budget.30  When faced with the
limitations have been enacted in virtually every state and have been both gen-
eral–millage limits; rate increase limits; assessment limitations—and specific—e.g.,
relief targeted by age, disability, or military status. See id.  In addition, thirty-six
states now impose limits on local jurisdictions’ ability to generate revenues beyond
some specified point or to make expenditures. See id.  The overall percentage of
revenue from the property tax has in fact declined nationally from 34% in 1977 to
30% in 2014. See TPC Briefing Book, supra note 23, at ch. 3.
26. Localities typically respond to changes in values of underlying property by
adjusting the tax rate to be applied against the base.  When costs increase or prop-
erty values decline, the rate is adjusted upward thus stabilizing the revenue stream.
Because budgets are usually set annually, rates may change regularly.  The value of
property—usually defined as fair market value—is subject to less flux because such
changes are generally slower to become manifest.
27. See TPC Briefing Book supra note 23, at ch. 3. Data published by the Tax
Policy Center report that in 2014, revenue from sales taxes constituted 7% of gen-
eral revenues; revenue from individual income taxes constituted 2% of revenues;
and “other taxes” contributed slightly more than two percent of revenues. See id.
Revenues from sales taxes increased overall during this period. See id.
28. For arguments in favor of users bearing the expense of public amenities
or facilities, see Suellen M. Wolfe, Municipal Finance and the Commerce Clause: Are
User Fees the Next Target of the “Silver Bullet”?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 727, 733–34 (1997)
(outlining the “many advantages” of user charge financing); ADVISORY COMM’N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FINANCING PUBLIC PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 22
(1984), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/policy/a-96.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K3AD-56Q3] (arguing that user charges provide “a means of fiscal disci-
pline for both service providers . . . and facility users,” can “encourage better main-
tenance[,]” “[o]ffer more efficient allocation of public resources” and “[p]rovide
widened choice”).
29. See, e.g., Elaine S. Povich, States Lure Tourists, Then Tax Them, PEW CHARITA-
BLE TRUSTS: STATELINE (June 15, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/6/15/states-lure-tourists-then-tax-them
[https://perma.cc/MB7H-VGR6] (reporting that states view taxes on services such
as “rental cars, hotel rooms and restaurant meals” as a way to pass costs of state and
local services to non-resident visitors).  Residents who avail themselves of these ser-
vices will, of course, bear these costs.
30. States, with the exception of Vermont, have statutory or constitutional lan-
guage that in some manner imposes a balanced budget requirement.  The spec-
6
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prospect of a deficit budget, a locality that is unwilling to cut services or
financially unable to bear the costs of new, necessary services may turn to
user charges and fees to fill the budgetary gap.  Localities in recent years
have been confronted with requirements for increased spending—crimi-
nal justice spending being one such demand—even as the Great Recession
of 2008 crippled state and local economies’ ability to accommodate in-
creases.31  Accelerating a trend that in fact began prior to 2008, many lo-
calities opted to also increase reliance on fees and fines generated
through the exercise of the police power to fill the revenue gap that
opened specifically within the criminal justice system as well as for general
budgetary purposes.32
trum ranges from a few states that require only that the governor’s proposed
budget be balanced to, on the other end of the spectrum, states having the most
stringent requirements with a constitutional prohibition against carrying a deficit
forward and requirements that the governor propose, and the legislature pass, a
balanced budget. See, e.g., State Balanced Budget Requirements Executive Summary,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/
state-balanced-budget-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/AB6L-2JWZ] (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2017).  There is very little general information on balanced budget
requirements in the charters of local governments.  Some state constitutions re-
strict municipal debt, some city charters restrict debt, and some cities apparently
operate without restriction.  Even in the absence of explicit language, two factors
work against a deficit budget on the local level: (1) local governments cannot issue
debt as the federal government can; and (2) the ultimate check exists: disgruntled
voters can throw offending officials out of office through the popular vote.
31. See, e.g., Tracy Gordon, State and Local Governments and the Great Recession,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-
local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/6XCD-QBSV].  This ar-
ticle provides:
More than in past economic downturns, state and local governments
were a prominent casualty of the recent recession.  States in particular
saw their revenues plunge.  Although state taxes have been rebounding,
local property taxes have dipped, consistent with a two- to three-year lag
between home prices and property tax rolls.  These reductions coincide
with state cutbacks in local aid, further squeezing local budgets.
Id.
32. Fines, fees, and bail constitute the three monetary penalties of criminal
justice debt.  A 2015 report prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers distin-
guishes between the three as follows:
Fines are monetary punishments for infractions, misdemeanors or felo-
nies.  Fines are intended to deter crime, punish offenders, and compen-
sate victims for losses.
Fees are itemized payments for court activities, supervision, or incarcera-
tion charged to defendants guilty of infractions, misdemeanors, or
felonies.
. . .
Bail is a bond payment for a defendant’s release from jail prior to court
proceedings, and the majority of a bail payment is returned to a defen-
dant after case disposition.
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, Fines, Fees, and Bail: Payments in the Criminal Justice
System That Disproportionately Impact the Poor 1 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9FF-PF54] [hereinafter CEA Brief].
7
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In short, law enforcement has become an important source of reve-
nue.33  For example, in fiscal year 2016, New York City collected approxi-
mately $993 million in fines for violations of a variety of city laws and
regulations: parking and moving (red light, bus lanes, speed cameras);
“quality of life” (noise and littering); consumer affairs; and public
health—a substantial portion of the city’s miscellaneous revenue.34  More
than one-half of this amount came from fines for parking violations.35
Ferguson, Missouri was thus far from alone in its increasing reliance
on traffic fines to balance its municipal budget.36  The events of August 9,
2014, however, provide the worst-case scenario exemplifying all that can
go wrong when local government relies upon traffic fines to generate reve-
nue making its police force and municipal court system an integral part of
that effort.
33. The CEA Brief alludes to data reflecting reliance on use of revenue from
traffic tickets and fines “not only to ensure safety but also as a tool to raise revenue
[citing to one jurisdiction that responded] to a 10 percent budget shortfall by
issuing 6 percent more tickets.” See id. at 2.  For an earlier report more definitively
establishing a link between local fiscal considerations and the issuance of traffic
citations, see Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror:
Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 88
(2009).  Focusing on several counties in North Carolina, the authors empirically
established a revenue motive in traffic ticketing, finding “[p]ositive changes in lo-
cal revenue have no statistical effect on the changes in the tickets issued, but we
find evidence that law enforcement officials issue significantly more tickets in the
year following a decline in local revenue.” See id.  Finally, writing in 2015, Daniel
Hummel reported the empirical finding that there existed on a national basis “a
relationship between indicators of budget health and the incidence of ticketing.”
See Daniel Hummel, Traffic Tickets: Public Safety Concerns or Budget Building Tools, 47
ADMIN. & SOC. 298, 314 (2015).  There are clearly significant amounts generated
through traffic ticketing.  The National Motorists Association Blog reported in a
2007 posting that, though it is impossible to know exactly how many traffic tickets
are issued annually “somewhere between 25 million and 50 million tickets are is-
sued each year.”  It continued: “Assuming an average ticket cost of $150.00, the
total up front profit from tickets ranges from 3.75 to 7.5 billion dollars.” See Traffic
Tickets Are Big Business, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N BLOG (Oct. 12, 2007), www.motor-
ists.org/blog/traffic-tickets-are-big-business/ [https://perma.cc/Y6BX-UEEM].
34. See Scott M. Stringer, NYC Budget Brief, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. CITY COMPTROL-
LER 1 (May 2017), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/
New-York-City-Fine-Revenues-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNH4-S8MP].
35. See id.  Moving violations ticketed by a police officer constituted a rela-
tively insignificantly part of this total amount: less than 5% in recent years. See id.
at 2.  The bulk of moving violation revenues flow through to the state though reve-
nue from parking violations is retained by the city. See id.  The report also notes,
however, that revenues from automated moving violations retained by the city have
increased significantly in the last few years. See id. at 3.
36. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 3 (reporting in their study that “racism
in policing and use of the municipal justice system to raise revenue as regional
issues [in the St. Louis area]”).
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II. FERGUSON, MO.
The DOJ, in assessing police practices in Ferguson in 2014, deter-
mined that law enforcement was deliberately revenue driven and that
these practices contributed importantly to a pattern of unconstitutional
policing and discrimination against the city’s predominately black and
poor population.37
A brief discussion of changing demographics is helpful in establishing
the financial and racial context in which this practice became extant in
that city.  Around 2000, Ferguson began to change in complexion as black
flight from inner-city St. Louis accelerated.38  The city, a suburb immedi-
ately adjacent to St. Louis (and itself earlier a residential haven for whites
fleeing St. Louis) went from three-fourths white to two-thirds black by
2010.39  In the meantime, Ferguson’s governance and police force re-
mained predominantly white.40
The predominantly African-American newcomers appear to have
been financially stable initially, as was the town.  This is an important
point, for it means that as such, Ferguson was able to rely primarily on
traditional revenue sources in order to pay its bills.41  Residents and conse-
quently the city itself were hard hit, however, by the Great Recession of
37. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 2 (“Ferguson’s law enforcement
practices are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety
needs.  This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of
Ferguson’s police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional polic-
ing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due
process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson com-
munity.  Further, Ferguson’s police and municipal court practices both reflect and
exacerbate racial bias, including racial stereotypes.  Ferguson’s own data establish
clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans.  The evidence
shows that discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities.”).
38. See generally id.
39. See Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson: Public Policies at the Root of Its
Troubles, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/mak-
ing-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/5CWR-A5G6] (“By 1980, Ferguson was 14 per-
cent black; by 1990, 25 percent; by 2000, 52 percent; and by 2010, 67 percent.”).
40. In 2014, Ferguson had a white mayor and a school board composed of six
whites and one Hispanic.  Its city council had one black member and its police
force was 6% black. See Jeff Smith, In Ferguson, Black Town, White Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/opinion/in-ferguson-
black-town-white-power.html [https://perma.cc/4XCM-WCEA].
41. The DOJ report summarized communications establishing the focus on
revenue generation and noting that the city budgeted for “sizeable increases in
municipal fines and fees each year, exhort[ing] police and court staff to deliver
those revenue increases, and closely monitor[ing] whether those increases [were]
achieved.” See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 2.  Two communications
provided as examples asked that ticket writing be ramped up in order to raise
collections (March 2010); and later that the police department deliver a 10% in-
crease in order to offset an expected substantial tax shortfall.  A more detailed
discussion of these and other communications as well as a general discussion of the
efforts to generate additional revenue can be found in part III of the report. See id.
at 9–15 (“Ferguson Law Enforcement Efforts are Focused on Generating
Revenue”).
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2008.42  Unemployment soared from 5% to greater than 13%.43  Sub-
prime lending facilitated earlier purchases of homes that plunged in value
as the housing bubble burst.44  Property tax revenues thus languished as
property owners encountered increasing difficulty in bearing that cost (an
abnormally high number of foreclosures took place).  Further, aggregate
declines in property values caused shrinkage in the overall value of tax
rolls.45  Indeed, as recently as the second quarter of 2014, 42% of all mort-
gaged Ferguson properties remained underwater.46  (Comparatively, the
national level for under-water properties was 13.3% and the Missouri state
level was 17.5%).47
42. See Denver Nicks, How Ferguson Went from Middle Class to Poor in a Genera-
tion, TIME MAG. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://time.com/3138176/ferguson-demo-
graphic-change/ [https://perma.cc/R9RH-EVBP].
43. See id. (“In 2000, the town’s population was roughly split between black
and white with an unemployment rate of 5%.  By 2010, the population was two-
thirds black, unemployment had exceeded 13%, and the number of residents liv-
ing in poverty had doubled in a decade.”).
44. See Jim Gallagher & Walker Moskop, Home Price Recovery Skips Some St. Louis
Area Neighborhoods, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.stltoday
.com/business/local/home-price-recovery-skips-some-st-louis-area-
neighborhoods/article_e8d6c728-f343-532c-abc7-174c84978469.html [https://per
ma.cc/6HUV-63HW].  Areas north of St. Louis (including Ferguson) were
“ground zero for subprime lending.”  That area was, after the Great Recession of
2008, hardest hit by foreclosures. See id. “Prices are still [at the time of this publi-
cation] 15% and more below the levels of 15 years earlier.” Id.; see also John Light,
Ferguson, the Foreclosure Crisis and America’s Hedge-Fund Landlords, MOYERS & CO.
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/09/05/ferguson-the-foreclosure-cri-
sis-and-americas-hedge-fund-landlords/ [https://perma.cc/W5JM-R47J].
45. The already tepid recovery has stalled and property values in Ferguson
have declined further in the wake of the Michael Brown shooting. See Daniel
Rivero, Ferguson Home Values Are Plummeting, and Residents Are Feeling the Pain, SPLIN-
TER, (Mar. 16, 2015, 07:33 AM), http://splinternews.com/ferguson-home-values-
are-plummeting-and-residents-are-1793846415 [https://perma.cc/BMY2-P7FG].
46. See Phil Hall, The Other Ferguson Story: The Foreclosure Crisis, NAT’L MORT-
GAGE PROFESSIONAL MAG. (Aug. 11, 2015) http://nationalmortgageprofessional
.com/news/55305/other-ferguson-story-foreclosure-crisis [https://perma.cc/
8EVP-XTEV].
47. See id.  Though beyond the scope of this paper, I note that the dispropor-
tionate racial impact of combined subprime lending, the collapse of the housing
market, and ensuing foreclosures extended far beyond Ferguson; it was a part of
the national financial meltdown.  Ferguson is simply one more unfortunate exam-
ple of that coalescence of events.  For example, see Carolina Reid & Elizabeth
Laderman, The Untold Costs of Subprime Lending: Examining the Links Among Higher-
Priced Lending, Foreclosures and Race in California, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (Aug. 6,
2009), http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/wp2009-09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TB5N-KY7Y]; see also Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Sub-
prime Loans: Racialized Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 124
(2009); Renae Merle, Minorities Hit Harder by Foreclosure Crisis: Racial Disparity Ex-
pected to Continue, Lending Study Finds, WASH. POST, June 19, 2010, A12; Debbie
Gruenstein Bocian et al., Foreclosures by Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Cri-
sis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (June 18, 2010), http://www.responsiblelend-
ing.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LWG-5KER].
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The property tax as structured in Missouri did not permit administra-
tive adjustments that might have resulted in increased revenue.  Missouri
is one of the thirty states that has a tax and spending limitation applicable
to the property tax.48  Revenues from the property tax can, thus, not be
increased without voter approval.  In any event, such approval would have
proven meaningless during and after the 2008 recession in light of falling
property values and high levels of taxpayer unemployment.
Further, collections of retail sales taxes, which were in fact the largest
contributor to local revenues, also declined during this period.49  As a re-
sult, those in charge of Ferguson governance—not wishing to trim ser-
vices—turned to the policing system in order to generate needed revenue.
48. This is the Hancock Amendment, amending the Missouri constitution in
1980. See MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 16–23.  The Tax Policy Center’s briefing book
explains Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs) as follows: “TELs restrict the
growth of government revenues or spending by either capping them at fixed dollar
amount or limiting their growth rate to match increase in population, inflation,
personal income, or some combination of those factors.”  TPC Briefing Book,
supra note 23, at ch. 5.  Missouri’s TEL is among the more restrictive of these in
that it is one of the six states that require voter approval to exceed the applicable
limitation. See MO. CONST. art. X, § 16.
49. A brief perusal of Annual Operating Budgets for Ferguson, Missouri, be-
ginning with the 2007–2008 fiscal year and ending with 2017–2018 shows the rela-
tive importance of five principal self-generating revenue sources for the city for
that decade.  The top in 2006–07 were (in order of revenue importance): the sales
tax (by far the major revenue source generating slightly more than 30% of all
revenues in 2006); the utility gross receipts tax; fines and forfeitures; and property
taxes.  The latter four sources were of relative equal importance at approximately
4.5% of the actual budget.  Note that, even at this point, fines and forfeitures are
of slightly more fiscal importance than is the property tax. See CITY OF FERGUSON,
MO., ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2006–07 (June 13, 2006), http://
www.fergusoncity.com/documentcenter/view/133 [https://perma.cc/22DB-
8VTC].  By 2012, the city had experienced a sharp decline in sales tax revenues.
The budget report for that year, noting that the city is “highly dependent on sales
tax receipts” (anywhere from 30% to 40% of total combined revenues), and re-
ported that, “[i]n fact, . . . sales tax collections from all sources . . . decreased from
$6,879,000 in FY 2006–2007 to $5,804,000 in FY 2010–2011.” See CITY OF FERGU-
SON, MO., ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2012–2013 v (June 26, 2012),
http://www.fergusoncity.com/documentcenter/view/1067 [https://perma.cc/
M6PU-4UA7].  The report continued “[t]his is a decrease of about $1,274,000 or
almost 20%.” See id.  By this time, revenues from fines and public safety infractions
had become the third most important source of revenue remaining ahead of the
property tax in fiscal importance.  The importance and significance of this shift is
reflected in the DOJ Report.  In 2012, during a debate over the reappointment of
one of the traffic court judges, “[t]he City Manager acknowledged mixed reviews
of the Judge’s work but urged that the Judge be reappointed, noting that ‘[i]t goes
without saying the City cannot afford to lose any efficiency in our Courts, nor expe-
rience any decrease in our Fines and Forfeitures.’” See DOJ Ferguson Report,
supra note 4, at 15.  The budget for fiscal year 2015–16 shows a sharp decline of
about 50% in expected collections from fines and related fees and costs beginning
with 2015.  To reiterate, the sales tax remained the most important revenue source
during that period.  That continues to be the case. See CITY OF FERGUSON, MO.,
ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2015–2016 51 (June 24, 2015), http://
www.fergusoncity.com/documentcenter/view/1849 [https://perma.cc/46AJ-
UCDL].
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The police force was instructed to become more aggressive in enforcing
traffic and lifestyle regulations.  In short, in deciding how to handle viola-
tions, officers were expected to exercise less discretion and cite much
more aggressively.50
The DOJ report provides dozens of examples of the ways in which
pressure to raise revenue led to very aggressive policing sometimes of
questionable constitutionality.  A few examples: Fourth Amendment viola-
tions—numerous “pedestrian checks” or disruptions of social gatherings
of African-Americans for legally unsupportable reasons,51 with “failure to
comply” charges being particularly problematic.52  First Amendment viola-
tions: Arrests and citations for indecent language or gestures or recording
police actions.53  And Fourth Amendment excessive force violations
through the excessive use of Electronic Control Weapons and canines.54
Multiple traffic citations were the norm.  A traffic stop could lead to
multiple citations for the same infraction.55  Or three or four charges in
one stop with officers sometimes competing “to see who can issue the larg-
est number of citations [(the highest number reported was fourteen)]
during a single stop.”56  A stop could trigger not only a moving violation
(DWI, for example) but also other related violations like “speeding, failure
to maintain a single lane, no insurance, no seat belt, etc.”57  Passengers
were not immune to excesses; the report details several instances in which
police demanded identification from all passengers with citation for
non-compliance.58
The DOJ report reflects the policing and multiplier effect of these
revenue-generating practices.  The issuance of what might have been dis-
cretionary citations fell disproportionately on black residents.  Though Afri-
can-Americans constituted only 67% of the population, that segment of
50. The DOJ Report summarized communications establishing the focus on
revenue generation and noted that the city budgeted for “sizeable increases in
municipal fines and fees each year, exhort[ing] police and court staff to deliver
those revenue increases, and closely monitor[ing] whether those increases [were]
achieved.” See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 2.  Two communications
provided as examples asked that ticket writing be ramped up in order to raise
collections (March 2010); and later that the Police Department deliver a 10% in-
crease in order to offset an expected substantial tax shortfall.  A more detailed
discussion of these and other communications as well as a general discussion of the
efforts to generate additional revenue can be found in part III of the report: “Fer-
guson Law Enforcement Efforts are Focused on Generating Revenue.” See id. at
9–15.
51. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 18.
52. See id. at 19–22.
53. See id. at 24–28.
54. See id. at 25, 28–42.
55. See id. at 4.  “FPD officers routinely issue multiple citations during a single
stop, often for the same violation.” Id. at 11.
56. See id.
57. See id. (internal quotation omitted).
58. See id. at 21.
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the population “account[ed] for 85% of FPD’s traffic stops, 90% of FPD’s
citations, and 93% of FPD’s arrests from 2012 to 2014.”59  African Ameri-
cans were more than twice as likely to be searched during a traffic stop and
twice as likely to be cited.60  Blacks were more likely to receive multiple
citations when stopped receiving four or more citations during
seventy-three of those stops between October 2012 and July 2014.61  (Mul-
tiple citations were the case for non-African-Americans only twice during
the same period).62  Blacks accounted for 95% of walking charges; 94% of
all failure to comply charges; and 92% of all resisting arrest charges.63
And this is only a partial listing.
The Ferguson municipal courts were an integral part of this financial
arrangement and were similarly expected to contribute to the city’s reve-
nue stream.64  As such, noncompliance penalties were routinely imposed
upon persons cited who failed to make court appearances or pay fines in a
timely manner.  The report documents structural barriers to compliance
as well as examples of the ensuing financial burdens on those cited.  Al-
leged offenders, unable to simply pay and resolve the citation, encoun-
tered difficulties in the first instance in keeping court dates.  Reasons for
failures to appear were sometimes personal (no babysitter, work obliga-
tions, oversight, etc.)65 or the result of system failure.66  Assuming an ap-
pearance, roadblocks to compliance and ultimate resolution were both
systemic (e.g., flawed ticketing practices,67 crowded dockets,68 irregular
court procedures,69 court personnel refusal to accept partial pay-
ments70)—and when a citizen could afford an attorney, hostile attitudes
were exhibited by the court,71 fear of immediate incarceration or addi-
tional penalties,72 concern that driving privileges would be lost.73  As road-
59. See id. at 62.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Consider, for example, the following comments in the DOJ Report.  “Fer-
guson has allowed its focus on revenue generation to fundamentally compromise
the role of Ferguson’s municipal court.” See id. at 3.  “The City has made clear to
the Police Chief and the Municipal Judge that revenue generation must also be a
priority in court operations.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added).  “Court staff are keenly
aware that the City considers revenue generation to be the municipal court’s pri-
mary purpose.” Id. (emphasis added).
65. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 6–7.
66. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 43 (“It is a hallmark of due
process that individuals are entitled to adequate notice of the allegations made
against them and to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (citation omitted)).
67. See id. at 45.
68. See id. at 43.
69. See id. at 44.
70. See id. at 53.
71. See id. at 43–44.
72. See id. at 48–49.
73. See id. at 50.
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blocks to appearance were encountered, additional fines and court costs
followed the initial citation cost with attendant interest and penalties.74
This financial burden was even further compounded by separate failure to
appear charges.75 Already financially hard-pressed offenders faced bal-
looning expenses though the amounts initially involved seem relative
small: $50, $100, or $200.76  (I mention these amounts to make the point;
many readers, I would guess, have been similarly cited in the past and
either paid, thus ending the episode, or were availed of some other avenue
to address the matter.  Indeed, this latter treatment appears to have been
the case with a number of white violators in Ferguson.)77  As will be shown
in Part IV, the possible consequences of the failure to respond appropri-
ately to the citations issued cast a long shadow.78
It is impossible to know the actual genesis of this aggressive discretion-
ary exercise of the police power from an individual officer’s standpoint:
protection of public welfare or revenue collection?  The report, however,
speaks convincingly to targeted disingenuous practices—revenue collec-
tion masquerading as exercise of the police power—that occurred with
alarming frequency and were of questionable legality.79  The citation pol-
icy in place after 2008 and until 2014 appeared to abandon traditional
police discretion and was demonstrably racially discriminatory.  Subse-
quent related judicial proceedings threw far too many citizens who were
already financially hard pressed into economic peril in a process that was
all too often neither easily accessible nor transparent.
Pursuant to the DOJ findings, outsized and aggressively expansive col-
lections of fines have been halted through a consent decree negotiated
between the DOJ and the City of Ferguson.80  Reliance on the use of reve-
nues from fines and penalties per se has not, however, been outlawed.
Under present Missouri law, it has been the case generally that no more
than 30% of a municipality’s budget could be derived from such collec-
74. See id.
75. See id. at 42.  Note that the then-incumbent municipal court judge created
and implemented this expansive array of penalties with the approval of the city
managers. See id. at 14.
76. See id. at 52.  Ordower notes that even when fine amounts were less than
$100, fines and court costs for offenders lacking legal counsel caused final
amounts to be significantly greater than $100. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at
6.
77. Examination of records show a common practice in Ferguson of writing
off tickets for friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and themselves eliminating cita-
tions, fines, and fees. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 74–75.  The bene-
ficiaries of these practice were overwhelmingly white. See id.
78. See infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
79. See generally DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4.
80. See Consent Decree at 9, 22, 78–88, United States v. City of Ferguson, No.
4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
833431/download [https://perma.cc/5EVL-D8HZ]; Ordower et al., supra note 13,
at 2.
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tions.81  As a result of recent legislative changes, that percentage has been
lowered to 20% of the operating budget for Missouri municipalities gener-
ally.  For St. Louis counties (including Ferguson) and the city of St. Louis,
the applicable limit will be 12.5%.82  In the meantime, Ferguson voters
approved a sales tax increase as well as a utility tax increase.83  A property
tax rate increase was rejected.84
Obviously, these changes do not and cannot guarantee the consist-
ently defensible exercise of police discretion.  Further, Ferguson’s struc-
tural fiscal weaknesses remain.  Property tax collections remain flat.  There
is little that can be done about this; depressed property values will only
improve as the economy improves.  Sales tax collections are increasing but
slowly.  Thus, the worst practices have been thwarted for the present but
economic challenges persist.  As such, the possibility of abuse remains.
In sum, the DOJ found that law enforcement practices were driven by
revenue needs rather than a concern for public safety contributing to a
pattern of unconstitutional policing and raising due process procedural
concerns in the City’s municipal court.85  The report did not suggest that
treating revenue from fines as a general revenue source was problematic
per se.  Nor should it have made that suggestion.  I cannot, for example, as
a private citizen unilaterally decide to proceed through an intersection on
red and stop on green!  Assuming that the violation is so blatant as to
foreclose the possibility of the exercise of discretion to refrain from cita-
tion, as an offender or—worse—a serial offender I should be cited upon
each violation.
But the underlying question persists: when, if ever, should punitive
fines such as these constitute revenue for general public purposes even if
such use is permissible under state law?  The question concedes, as it must,
the basic necessity of regulatory fines.  Such fines are an indispensable
element of the reasonable exercise of the police power.86  Nevertheless,
considerations of overall basic fairness in allocating the financial burdens
of citizenship suggest that the power to fine should be exercised with
meaningful protections in place.  No one citizen or group of citizens
81. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 14 n.12.  For the record, Fergu-
son never reached this 30% limit in its reliance on fines and fees.
82. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 11.
83. See id. at 3.
84. See id. at 3.
85. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 2.
86. See R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering
the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1802–03 (2015) (“[F]ines
in the United States tend to be used primarily in courts of limited jurisdiction,
particularly traffic courts. . . .  In the United States, fines are used in forty-two
percent of courts of general jurisdiction and eighty-six percent of cases in courts of
limited jurisdiction. . . .  [Fines have several clear advantages such as being]
[c]heap to administer, produce revenues, can be undone in the event of a wrong-
ful conviction, . . . [and can] be matched to the means of the offender.” (internal
quotations and footnote omitted)).
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should be inordinately burdened with the general cost of governance even
in the face of sanctionable behavior as happens when revenue from fines
is used to fill general budgetary gaps.  Otherwise, there would exist a pow-
erful temptation (or as in Ferguson, a directive) to treat offenders as ready
sources of revenue.
Ordinarily, one would expect a transparent and procedurally sound
judicial process to provide a reasonable level of protection against ex-
ploitation through overly aggressive policing.  However, as Ferguson has
demonstrated, that may not always be the case; the municipal court failed
in that regard.  In a nutshell, where fairness is difficult or impossible to
achieve on an individual level, protection should be provided indirectly to
individuals on an entity level.  It is to that point that I now turn.87
III. GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE AND TAXPAYER PROTECTIONS
To reiterate, and out of fairness to Ferguson administrators, revenues
from traffic fines constituted the last financial resort for the Ferguson ad-
ministrators.  That source appears to have been exploited only when more
traditional tax and non-tax revenues proved inadequate.  Importantly, reli-
ance on a mix of tax and non-tax revenue sources is entirely appropriate
and has been a matter of common practice.88  In understanding why traf-
fic fines should not, however, be an option when localities face budgetary
deficits, a brief reprise of financial options and their inherent taxpayer
protections is useful.
First, taxes are the price we pay—but not voluntarily.  Rather, govern-
ment’s power to tax (a power that dates from the dawn of the republic)
exists because it is essential to the very existence of government.89  Taxes
are involuntary fees levied on individuals or corporations and enforced by
a government entity, whether local, regional, or national in order to fi-
nance government activities.90  The general theory of taxation puts it this
87. The ability to challenge a citation in a judicial proceeding is unquestiona-
bly one such protection.  Nevertheless, as Ferguson establishes, that protection
may or may not be available because of systemic failures.  I will explore possible
avenues to protect against excessive reliance on traffic and lifestyle fines specifi-
cally in Part V. See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text.
88. In their 1989 study of American cities, Helen Ladd and John Yinger found
that “revenue diversification and redefinition of the tax base provided substantial
assistance to those cities hit hardest by economic changes” during the period
1972–82, and concluded that revenue diversification helps, though it “is unlikely
to solve the fiscal problems of U.S. cities.” See HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER,
AMERICA’S AILING CITIES: FISCAL HEALTH AND THE DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY 139, 141
(1989).
89. Taxation is the first power stated in the U.S. Constitution, but its founda-
tion is “ ‘in society itself.’” See Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514, 524, 563
(1830) (“[T]he power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the
very existence of government . . . .” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
428 (1819))).
90. See, e.g., What are “Taxes”, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/t/taxes.asp [https://perma.cc/WN3A-B9LW] (last visited June 16, 2017).
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way: “[T]axes are imposed as a compensation for something received by
the tax-payer, . . . general taxes are paid for the support of government in
return for protection to life, liberty, and property . . . .”91
A. Taxes and Inherent Protections
Though taxes are involuntary exactions, taxpayers are protected
against limitless liability.  To be sure, “tax” can be a nebulous term.92
Adam Smith, however, in 1776, laid out the classic criteria for a well-de-
signed tax arguing that such a levy would always exhibit four basic
characteristics:
Equity—Each person should contribute to government to the ex-
tent that they are able [Fairness];
Certainty—The time, manner and payment of the tax should be
clear and certain [When and where to pay: stability and
transparency];
Convenience—A tax should be levied at a time and in a manner
that makes it convenient for the person taxes to pay it [a clear
path to discharge]; and
Efficiency—A tax should extract from the taxpayer no more than
is necessary [limit collection overhead and avoid deadweight
loss].93
91. ROBERT DESTY, AMERICAN LAW OF TAXATION: AS DETERMINED IN THE
COURTS OF LAST RESORT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1884).
92. In 1868, the Supreme Court approvingly quoted the Supreme Court of
New Jersey’s definition of tax: “ ‘A tax, in its essential characteristics . . . is not a
debt nor in the nature of a debt. A tax is an impost levied by authority of govern-
ment upon its citizens, or subjects, for the support of the State. It is not founded
on contract or agreement. It operates in invitum. . . .’”  Lane County v. Oregon, 74
U.S. 71, 80 (1868).  Fifty years later, when attempting to distinguish between a
penalty and a tax, the Court defined tax in this way: “Generally speaking, a tax is a
pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting
the government.”  New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 140 (1908).  In 1931, the
Court again distinguished between a penalty and a tax: “A tax is an enforced con-
tribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty, as the word is here
used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”
United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  More recently, the Court looked to the word’s “ordinary definition” to
interpret a state’s particular tax scheme.  CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama
Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 284 (2011).  The Court thus described tax as fol-
lows: “[W]e note what taxpayers have long since discovered—that the meaning of
‘tax’ is expansive. A State (or other governmental entity) seeking to raise revenue
may choose among multiple forms of taxation on property, income, transactions,
or activities.” Id. at 284–85.  Indeed, although the Constitution uses the phrase
“direct taxes” it too leaves the term undefined. See Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal
Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 839, 847 (2009) (“There is no definition of ‘direct tax’ in the Constitu-
tion, and none was offered to the delegates in the 1787 Constitutional
Convention.”).
93. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 371–72 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (emphasis added).
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Protection against excessive liability is a feature of each major govern-
mental revenue source because liability is predicated upon identified
transactions and in accordance with defined parameters each of which res-
onates with the Smith criteria.  Income taxes are (usually) annually deter-
mined and extract a percentage of individual or corporate income
appropriately defined and in accordance with set rates.  Liability will thus
vary in accordance with each individual base.94  General retail sales taxes
and excise taxes are levied on identified goods and services each time a
defined transaction occurs.  The amount levied will vary dependent upon
the value of the underlying transaction.  The absence of a limit on the
number of such transactions in which a taxpayer may engage annually
does not, however, vitiate taxpayer protection.  Rather, with these levies it
is incumbent upon the taxpayer himself to refrain from engaging in profli-
gate spending on affected taxable transactions that might otherwise un-
dermine his individual financial solvency.  In short, that taxpayer’s own
resources are expected to provide protection against disproportionate lia-
bility—a self-imposed credit limit, if you will!95  Finally, property tax liabil-
ity is determined by applying a rate determined by the governing body
against the fair market value of the property.  The tax base is determined
through annual appraisal and the rate to be applied against that base can-
not be greater than that which is necessary in order to reach the projected
budget.96  Further, the levy can only be imposed annually.  Thus, the cost
imposed upon the taxpayer is presumed to be commensurate with what
she can bear in order to retain ownership of the affected property.97  The
premise here is that at the end of the day, a rational taxpayer will not
retain ownership of property that is too expensive to service.
Finally, particularly with regard to state and local taxes, state constitu-
tions are replete with provisions intended to guard against unreasonable
94. For a summary of the design of income taxes, see Emil M. Sunley & Janet
G. Stotsky, Income Tax, Federal, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY
196, 196–98 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
95. For a summary of the design of sales and use taxes, see M. DAVID GELFAND
ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 61–84 (3d ed.
2007).
96. For a summary of the design of property taxes, see id. at 44–57.  This is, of
course, an oversimplification but accurately describes the basic structure.  Fair
market value is at least legislatively mandated as the base in every jurisdiction that
relies upon the tax and is more often a state constitutional requirement.  The
amount to be generated cannot exceed the revenues necessary to reach a balanced
budget.
97. There are of course targeted mechanisms to protect those property own-
ers who, for compelling policy reasons, are accorded relief from what might other-
wise be an inordinate tax burden. See, e.g., Property Tax Circuit Breakers, INST. ON
TAXATION AND ECON. POL’Y (2016), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/circuit-
breakerpb2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHR8-X9GN] (briefly summarizing how
circuit breakers work to provide targeted tax relief at lower governmental cost).
An extended discussion of this and other relief measures is beyond the scope of
this Essay.
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liability.98  In short, states impose limits on localities’ ability generate
property tax revenues.99
B. Limiting Liability for Local Level Non-Tax Revenue Sources
I earlier noted that though the property tax is the primary revenue
source of for services provided by local government, when that revenue
stream proves insufficient to offset those costs, the governing body may
rely upon a mix of tax and non-tax alternative sources.100  Included here
may be taxes in addition to the property tax–-general retail sales and ex-
cise taxes being the usual additional components—as well as user charges
and fees.  This reliance is not without risk of excessive consumer liability,
however.  While, as has been shown, traditional general tax revenue
sources have inherent taxpayer protections, reliance upon non-tax reve-
nues such as user charges and fees potentially undermine the expectation
that each person against whom an exaction is levied will be compelled to
bear no more than her fair share of public costs.101  In general however, as
individually structured, the additional non-tax sources listed above as pres-
ently administered also provide protections albeit in different ways.
Courts distinguish fines and user fees from general purpose and ex-
cise taxes primarily by focusing on the use to which any resultant revenues
can be put. User charges and fees are quite clearly non-tax revenue
sources.  Tax proceeds, including those from excise taxes levied, for exam-
ple, on alcohol and tobacco, are used to fund government generally.102
In contrast, the proceeds of user charges imposed upon patrons of, for
example, publicly provided libraries or parks or to license certain activ-
ity—whether recreational (i.e., fishing or hunting, or business i.e., con-
struction, services, etc.)—can only be used to defray the expenses of
administering and maintaining that public good or maintaining oversight
for that specific activity.  In short, such revenues are earmarked for a speci-
fied use.103  Failure to so earmark and use can result in the invalidation of
98. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text alluding to language in the
Missouri Constitution providing precisely this kind of protection.
99. See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Trouble with Tax Increase
Limitations, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 50, 51–52 (2013). The authors explain how the
Tax Increase Limitation rules are intended to work from the voters’ point of view
but criticize these rules in arguing that Tax Increase Limitation rules in combina-
tion with Balanced Budget Requirements amplify revenue volatility without con-
trolling the size of government. See id. at 51.
100. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
101. I use “fair” here to capture the notion that no citizen will be dispropor-
tionately burdened by public levies.
102. Other examples of excise taxes that are in place in numerous locations
throughout the United States also used as general funds include taxes on meals,
hotel and motel rentals, and rental automobiles. See supra note 28 & 30 and ac-
companying text.
103. See generally REBECCA HELMES, BLOOMBERG: INFRASTRUCTURE INV. & POL-
ICY REPORT, TAX-VERSUS-FEE DISTINCTION UNDERPINS MAJOR TRANSPORTATION, EMIS-
SIONS FUNDING DEBATES (2014). “The difference between a tax and a fee generally
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the levy.104  Further, in the aggregate, revenues generated cannot exceed
amounts needed to provide the amenity.105  As such, the possibility of us-
ing such receipts for general purpose government is circumscribed.  Fi-
nally, and importantly, unlike exactions under the general taxes noted,
liability for user fees and charges of the kind noted to this point can be
avoided entirely should the potential payee simply refrain from accessing
the amenity or seeking the service.  In short, unlike a tax, payment of a
user charge or fee is not compulsory for a non-user.
Realistically, there remains the possibility that the cost of providing a
given amenity may be substantially inflated in order to produce more reve-
nue through fees than might be needed for that public good.  In that case,
unless the fee were recharacterized as a tax, overages could conceivably be
diverted to some other unrelated governmental use, end-running taxpayer
protections.  This kind of global review is, at best, difficult to achieve be-
cause cases challenging amounts imposed are decided on an individual
basis.  In an important new article, Professor Darien Shanske has sug-
gested that the inapplicability of protections in many states’ fiscal constitu-
tions to user charges and fees have left courts no alternative other than to
engage in extensive substantive case-by-case review in the effort to thwart
this kind of governmental legerdemain.106  He argues that courts should
shift the focus and undertake a procedural review of the rate-making pro-
cess.107  Doing so would for the first time permit a more deeply informed
turns on the use of the revenue.  Is the revenue meant to raise money that can be
used to defray the general costs of government?  It is a tax.  Is the revenue meant
to pay for the costs of a specific government program or service?  It is a fee.” Id.
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that
tolls charged for passage on the Dulles Toll Road are user fees, not taxes, under
Virginia law. See Corr v. Metro Wash. Airports Auth., 740 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir.
2014) (explaining that it was a fee because toll road users pay the tolls in exchange
for a particularized benefit not shared by the general public; drivers aren’t com-
pelled by government to pay the tolls or accept the benefits of the project facilities;
and the tolls are collected solely to fund the project, and not to raise general
revenues).
104. See, e.g., TABOR Found. v. Colo. Bridge Enter., 353 P.3d 896, 901 (Colo.
App. 2014).  The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed that the Colorado Bridge
Enterprise (CBE) didn’t levy a tax prohibited by the state’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights
(TABOR) when it imposed a bridge safety surcharge on vehicles in the state that
are subject to registration fees. See id. at 902.  The bridge safety surcharge was
found to be a fee and thereby saved from being declared an unconstitutional tax
in a state where voters must approve any tax increase. See id.
105. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 13.  Fees incident to regulatory activ-
ity “may match the cost of issuing the license or making the inspection.” See id.  “If
they do so, they are a proper exercise of the police power.  If they raise revenue in
excess of the actual cost of regulation, they may exceed the police power under
which they are enacted.” Id. at 13.
106. See Darien Shanske, Interpreting State Fiscal Constitutions: A Modest Proposal,
70 RUTGERS U. L. REV (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2989313 [https://perma.cc/RM5E-RKNT].
107. See id.
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss5/3
2017] CONFLATING POWER TO FINE WITH POWER TO TAX 945
financial assessment of rate-setting practices and would hopefully bring
heightened financial protection for consumers of the service.108
In any event, even in the absence currently of the kind of inquiry
suggested by Professor Shanske, localities are generally unable to engage
in limitless exploitation of either tax or non-tax revenue sources in the
ongoing quest for funds.  Overall, within each revenue category, there ex-
ist either explicit or tacit limits on the entity itself that bring some balance
and a reasonable measure of fairness to the allocation of public costs.
The foregoing discussion has not, however, addressed punitive fines
such as traffic fines.  In the next section, I discuss and distinguish that
category of exactions.
IV. TRAFFIC (AND OTHER) FINES AS GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL REVENUE
Like taxes, user charges, and fees, traffic fines are involuntary contri-
butions to local government.  But there the similarity ends.
Regulatory fines are not literally taxes.  They do not bear any of the
hallmarks of a tax.  They are not (1) predicated upon notions of equity or
ability to contribute to government; (2) certain as to time, manner, or
payment of the levy should the person cited choose to contest a citation;
(3) necessarily amenable to convenient discharge; and (4) subject to
budgetary constraints that might otherwise limit overall collections.
Rather, the levy is imposed as a consequence of behavior that violates
some pre-determined norm for behavior.  It remains an extraction in-
tended to punish and has none of the protections against excessive collec-
tion that are inherent in a traditionally structured tax.
Professor Ordower has argued that even in the absence of these at-
tributes, the fines and related fees levied in Ferguson through 2014 may
have effectively become taxes because of their use for general governmen-
tal purposes.109  In that case, such use should not protect amounts of fines
that were then being levied as a constitutional exercise of the taxing
power.  Instead, as with other taxes—property and retail sales taxes—post
1980 increases in fine amounts (the amount of the levy) would have re-
quired voter approval in Missouri pursuant to the 1980 constitutional
amendment.  This did not happen.  As such, taxpayers adversely affected
by then-extant fining practices could be able to challenge the legality of
post-1980 increases compelling a prospective roll-back to 1980 levels.110
In effect, increased amounts paid post-1980 would be illegally levied taxes.
Regulatory fines are also not equivalent to user charges and fees.  As
has been discussed, user fees are earmarked for support of specific govern-
ment services being provided to the person bearing that cost.111  A traffic
108. See id. (manuscript at 4).
109. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 18–22 (“Part 3. Fines as taxes: State
Constitutional Tax Limitations”).
110. See generally id.
111. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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offender is not voluntarily purchasing a service or privilege of any kind.
Moreover, though the traffic infraction might be seen as a consumer
choice, the fine amount may not be controllable by the putative offender
in the same sense as is the consumer who bears the cost of a transactional
user charge or fee.  In the wake of the alleged infraction, consumer con-
trol has been displaced by the enforcer’s sole discretion regarding
whether or not to cite.112
This may especially be the case where policing is revenue driven.  The
offender may have broken the law, but what may legitimately have been a
stop for speeding (a standard that may also be difficult for a driver to
anticipate113) becomes an additional citation for an expired license, fail-
ure to produce proof of insurance, etc.114  The offender is cited both for
an infraction and for other related possibly rarely enforced minor infrac-
tions.  In short, the offender has no control over the ultimate cost of such
citations.115
As such, it is one thing to have imposed and to pay a fine legitimately
imposed for some “reasonable” infraction.  It is quite another to be as-
sessed a fine simply because police departments have ticketing or arrest
quotas.  Though a fine is an appropriate exercise of the police power
when properly deployed, in the array of possible sources of support for
local government, a fine has no place.
For all of these reasons and with the presumptively correct right to
exercise discretion vested in the enforcer, traffic fines should not be
treated as legitimate non-tax revenue sources available for general budget-
ary purposes.  This follows even in the absence of applicable constitutional
limits and where fines are not treated as the functional equivalent of an
illegally levied tax.  In other words, the practice of using fine revenue for
purposes of general governance is troubling because of its overall distor-
tive effect even without a discriminatory animus.
112. There is always the possibility that revenues generated through the law
enforcement system would be earmarked exclusively for the support of those activi-
ties.  That is clearly not the case here.
113. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  Traffic laws are likely to vary
both in detail and enforcement practices from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
114. See supra note 56 and accompanying text that reports competitions
among Ferguson policemen for most citations written in a single stop.
115. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 8; see also supra note 112 and accom-
panying text.  “While supervisors may establish general arrest policies that pressure
officers to increase arrests and citation issuance to achieve departmental arrest
goals, the officer nevertheless may elect to arrest, warn, or ignore any given of-
fense.”  Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 8 (emphasis added).  In an interesting
twist, the state of Nevada recently found itself in a financial quandary.  The reve-
nue from traffic tickets provided the majority of the state supreme court’s funding.
The court found itself facing a budget deficit when “the state highway patrol
shifted its focus towards more dangerous violations causing the number of tickets
to decline more than 10 percent in two years.” See Matt Ford, The Problem with
Funding Government Through Fines, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-problem-with-funding-government-
through-fines/389387/ [https://perma.cc/L5MJ-EKZX].
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V. EFFECTS ON GOVERNANCE AND THE CIVIC SPIRIT
Ferguson provides textbook examples of all that can go wrong when
governments rely upon traffic fines as budgetary supplements.  The prac-
tice had global negative effects touching government, alleged offenders,
the civic spirit, and the police force itself.
Governance suffered.  The financial obfuscation practiced there was
corrosive and undermined the credibility of the governing entity.  Taxpay-
ers will inevitably lose confidence in a system that imposes costs that are
opaque, unfair, unpredictable, and onerous.
Alleged offenders were compelled to bear a disproportionate share of
the expenses of governance.  Ferguson residents generally had already
borne the cost of both the property tax, which is generally viewed as at
least mildly regressive, and the retail sales tax which is notoriously so.  Al-
leged offenders were effectively and (given the Ferguson racial dynamic)
selectively forced to bear additional costs for local services because of the
use of fines as general revenue.  The regressive effect of the overall burden
of civic costs on the predominantly poor residents of Ferguson was exacer-
bated given the combination of the retail sales tax and the very high level
of citation activity.  Needless to say, that regressive effect was increased
even further where the same individuals were cited on multiple additional
occasions.
That excessive burden imposed by the fine scheme in Ferguson also
led to economic hardship for its residents on an individual basis.  Profes-
sor Laura Appleman, in analyzing the explosion of criminal justice debt,
refers to “[a] bewildering array of fees, fines, court costs, non-payment
penalties, and high interest rates [that] have turned criminal process into
a booming revenue center for state courts and corrections.”116  In both
the criminal justice system and local governments like Ferguson, fines con-
stitute the first piece in that financial monstrosity.  A bit of imagery may be
helpful here.  Think of the fine as being at the tip of an inverted pyramid.
Many of those cited for infractions by the Ferguson police were unable to
pay.  The image makes the point; addressing fining practices is an impor-
tant first step to addressing not only aggressive policing but also financial
hardship stemming from interaction with the law enforcement system.
Further, unresolved citations may, in the present legal environment,
constitute ticking time bombs.  There presently loom far-reaching collat-
eral consequences.  In June of 2016, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided in Utah v. Strieff117 that a suspect subject to a valid, unrelated
outstanding arrest warrant (for an unpaid parking ticket in that case)
could be searched pursuant to that unrelated warrant during an unconsti-
tutional stop and incriminating evidence seized incident to that search
could be used against him.  Justice Sotomayor, in her eloquent dissent,
spoke to the holding’s unsettling consequence:
116. See Appleman, supra note 12, at 1483.
117. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
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This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand
your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic war-
rants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.  If the officer discov-
ers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse
his illegal stop and will admit it into evidence anything he hap-
pens to find by searching you after arresting you on the
warrant.118
The DOJ Ferguson report noted that of 21,000 people living in Fergu-
son, 16,000 have outstanding arrest warrants.119  The chilling possibilities
of what might happen to some of these residents speak for themselves.
Civic costs may also be high.  The DOJ report speaks eloquently to
this point: When police and courts treat people unfairly, unlawfully, or
disrespectfully, law enforcement loses legitimacy in the eyes of those who
have experienced, or even observed, the unjust conduct.  Further, this loss
of legitimacy makes individuals more likely to resist enforcement efforts
and less likely to prevent and investigate crime.120
Finally, effective policing that protects and serves is threatened.
When revenue generation becomes the focus and policing practices are
geared to that objective, public safety becomes a secondary concern (if
that) and community trust and cooperation are undermined.  Police eval-
uations and promotion are driven by the number of citations issued.  As a
result, community residents become potential offenders and sources of
revenue.  This is what happened in Ferguson.  It is also what ensues in
numerous other localities throughout the United States where the prac-
tice has become common.121
The state of Missouri moved to limit the extent to which such revenue
could be used for general purposes by imposing a cap of 30%.  This obvi-
ously stops well short of barring such reliance entirely—an ideal possibly
impossible to attain but is a step in the right direction.  That the practice is
being examined and curbed in and of itself provides a lesson worthy of
emulation.
The discussion thus far has focused on traffic fines.  Traffic fines, how-
ever, constitute only a part of policing practices that may morph into of-
fensive revenue collection.  In the continuous quest for enhanced
118. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
119. See DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 8.
120. See id. at 2 (“Over time, Ferguson’s police and municipal court practices
have sown deep mistrust between parts of the community and the police depart-
ment, undermining law enforcement legitimacy among African Americans in par-
ticular.”); see also Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 4 (stating perception of
unfairness undermines the willingness of segments of the population to cooperate
with law enforcement authorities).
121. See, e.g., Alexa Corcoran, A Handful of Colorado Towns Rely Heavily on
Money from Traffic Tickets, ROCKY MOUNTAIN PBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016, 11:04 PM),
http://www.rmpbs.org/blogs/news/a-handful-of-colorado-towns-rely-heavily-on-
money-from-traffic-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/8WAM-Q3RZ].
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revenue, in addition to regulatory fines like those for traffic violations,
ordinances could be enacted to target lifestyle choices or non-conforming
behavior.  As a result, such infractions could be cited simply because the
police power enabled such regulation.122  For example, the frequency of
citing African-Americans for jaywalking, something less than a “moving vi-
olation,” has proven problematic in many American cities.123
This possibility becomes of even more concern when limits are placed
solely on a municipality’s ability to use traffic fines as general revenues.
The limitations in place speak to traffic fines and not lifestyle fines.
This latitude is particularly problematic because, in the latter set of
fines, behaviors can be penalized simply because the offender is “out of
sync.”124  Ordinances that impose penalties for misaligned window blinds?
Or children playing outside?  Or young men wearing low-riders?125  Such
122. For example, Ferguson police officers’ ability to cite under the munici-
pal code extended to “nearly every aspect of civic life.” See DOJ Ferguson Report,
supra note 4, at 7.  The report continues
[i]n addition to mirroring some non-felony state law violations, such as
assault, stealing, and traffic violations, the code establishes housing viola-
tions, such as High Grass and Weeds; requirements for permits to rent an
apartment or use the City’s trash service; animal control ordinances, such
as Barking Dog and Dog Running at Large; and a number of other viola-
tions, such as Manner of Walking in Roadway.
Id. (citations omitted).  Michael Brown was first noticed by the police officer while
walking in the middle of the road.
123. See generally Jane Coaston, Opinion, Jaywalking While Black, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/opinion/jaywalking-while-
black-jacksonville-florida.html [https://perma.cc/2GSR-M3E3].  In Jacksonville,
Florida, an African-American man was cited for jaywalking ($62 fine) and “failing
to provide I.D.” ($136 fine). See id.  Failing to carry identification is not a crime in
Florida and “jaywalking” is a noncriminal infraction. See id.  The op-ed goes on to
note that
African Americans are disproportionately arrested for jaywalking and
other small-scale offenses nationwide.  Sacramento police issued more
than 200 tickets for jaywalking last year in the neighborhoods of North
Sacramento and Del Paso Heights.  While just 15 percent of residents of
that are African-American, black residents made up around 50 percent of
those ticketed.  In Urbana, Ill., the disparity was even more stark: From
2007 to 2011, 91 percent of those ticketed for jaywalking were black, in an
area where just 16 percent of residents are African American.
Id.
124. See generally RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016) (describing transformation
in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s of police power over individuals
through the successful challenge of long-standing vagrancy laws).
125. See, e.g., Pagedale Municipal Fines: Class Action Lawsuit Challenges Policing for
Profit in St. Louis Co. Municipal Court System, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/case/
pagedale-municipal-fines/ [https://perma.cc/2EBG-B72A] (last visited July 4,
2017).  These were all citable offences in Pagedale, Missouri-–a predominantly
black suburb that lies just outside of St. Louis. See id.  The city aggressively ticketed
its residents for harmless conditions and activities around their homes. See id.
According to the city code, Pagedale residents c[ould] be ticketed and
fined for:
Having mismatched curtains;
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fines should be seen as an abuse of discretion and, at best, of questionable
validity.  Overly aggressive enforcement of life-style ordinances or those
only nominally related to traffic control will almost certainly lead to prac-
tices no less offensive than those reported in Ferguson.126
Remediation is certainly warranted when such practices occur but as
Professor Ordower suggests, remediation becomes much more problem-
atic in the absence of apparent constitutional violations.127  The harm is
no less real; the person fined has been involuntarily burdened without any
of the protections that a taxpayer would have and improperly so.  Never-
theless, there seems no clear path to relief.
Traffic court procedures remain an option.  As established so clearly
in the DOJ report, however, that forum may be as much a part of the
problems as the police practices themselves.  Even in the absence of the
kind of irregularities evident in the Ferguson municipal court, traffic court
is probably not the venue most receptive to either tax- or constitutional-
law-based objections.  Class actions remain a possibility.  That approach
however, may be less of an option than has been the case in years past.128
Finally, states might consider the creation of a commission charged
with responsibility to review and recommend changes to traffic and
non-traffic fines.  The commission’s task might be fourfold: (1) Standard-
ize traffic laws and fining practices to the extent possible to eliminate in-
ter-jurisdictional differences that confuse drivers without adding to public
safety;129 (2) Reform traffic courts as necessary to complement reforms
under the first recommendation; (3) Make fines and fees income-sensitive;
and (4) Address and limit the extent to which revenue from non-traffic
fines may be used for municipal purposes.  For example, states might con-
sider earmarking such revenues for the support of local schools or for
Walking on the left-hand side of a crosswalk;
Wearing pants below one’s waist;
Having holes in window screens, and;
Having a barbeque in front of a house.
Id.  The Institute of Justice also notes that Pagedale affirmatively moved to ticket-
ing lifestyle offenses in the wake of new limitations on the use of revenue from
traffic fines for general governmental purposes in order to replace that lost reve-
nue. See id.
126. See, e.g., DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 4, at 21 n.15 (explaining that
some quality-of-life offenses can be so overbroad and generally applicable that they
could be struck down with a void for vagueness challenge).
127. See Ordower et al., supra note 13, at 23 (“Whenever local governments
transform what was historically a police and court law enforcement function into a
revenue function, state constitutional taxing limitations should apply to prevent
the use of the police power to raise revenue.”).
128. I raise this possibility only in the interest of raising as many options as
possible.  A discussion of the possibilities and ramifications of undertaking a class
action lawsuit is beyond the scope of this paper.
129. As noted earlier, jurisdictions tend to lack uniformity in both the detail
and enforcement of such laws.  See supra notes 55–58 & 112–14 and accompanying
text.
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community enhancement projects and barring use for general govern-
mental purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Symposium130 facilitates an important discussion, and questions
of financial practices should be among those raised.  There are almost cer-
tainly many more cities and towns like Ferguson dependent upon this
most untraditional non-tax revenue source.  Fiscal plight differs only in
degree.  In the face of these financial stressors and even without the dire
events that catapulted Ferguson into the national spotlight, local officials
must continue to strive for fairness and for transparency in the fullest
meaning of that word.
Ferguson’s lesson must inform this effort.  The police force should
not function as general tax collectors.  At its best, policing should be a
quintessential public good owing allegiance to the state or—more accu-
rately—the taxpayers that the force has pledged to “protect and serve.”
Police persons are simply unable to live up to this oath when those who
would be protected become instead targets of financial opportunity.
130. This Essay was written in conjunction with my participation at the 2016
Norman J. Shachoy Symposium at the Villanova University Charles Widger School
of Law.
27
Robinson: Fines: The Folly of Conflating the Power to Fine with the Power t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
